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Abstract
We investigate whether subjects’ behavior in the Arad and Rubinstein (2012) "11-20" game could be well
explained by the k-level process described by the authors. We replicated their game in our baseline experiment
and provided two other variations that retained the same mixed-strategy equilibrium but resulted in diﬀerent
predicted behavior by the k-level process. Our experiments results suggest that k-level process leads to inconsis-
tent predictions. In contrast to the standard k-level process as in Arad and Rubinstein, we allow players to best
respond stochastically in our "SK" model and compared the model’s statistical fit against the Quantal Response
Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchy Model. The SK model and Cognitive Model were able to outperform the
QRE in a statistical sense and performed as well as each other. In addition, the Cognitive Hierarchy and to lesser
extend the SK model, demonstrate consistent estimates. Our findings suggest that the behavioral assumptions
of Arad and Rubinstein k-level process does not fully explain behavior in the "11-20" and better explanations
could be obtained when one allows for stochastic best responds as in the SK and Cognitive Hierarchy Models.
Keywords: k-level, Cognitive Hierarchy, Quantal Response Equilibrium, "11-20" money request game
JEL Classification: C73, C91
1 Introduction
Deviations from the equilibrium predictions are a well-documented phenomenon in the literature of economic and
game theory experiments. The challenge in this field is the provision of better explanatory models. One explanation
posit that people often avoid the circular concepts embedded in equilibrium outcomes, in preferences for rule-of-
thumb behaviors (Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri, 2013). Furthermore, this explanation suggest that such
rule-of-thumb behaviors are closely associated with the steps of iterative reasoning employed by players. The k-
level (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001) model is a leading
candidate in this field.
The standard k-level model partitions the population of players into specific Lk types (k ∈ N). The model
thereafter posits a set hierarchal behavioral rules depending on the types of players. This hierarchy begins with
a non-strategic L0 type, who is assumed to follow some common knowledge behavioral rule. Such behavior is
analogous to the players’ instinctive reaction in the game and is often taken to be the uniform randomization over
all strategies.1 Higher Lk types (k > 0), assume that all other players are type Lk−1 and best respond to these
∗University of Exeter: cylc201@exeter.ac.uk
†University of Exeter and University of Haifa
1Whether the uniform randomization is the appropriate specification of the L0 type behavioral is by itself a debate. We find it
diﬃcult to see how even a non-strategic player will assign equal weights to strategies that are payoﬀ dominant and dominated.
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beliefs via iterative thought-experiments.2 A L1 type selects a strategy that is the best respond to the L0 behavior,
a L2 type to a L1, a L3 type to a L2 and so forth. Higher types are hence strategic in the same tradition of
"rationalizable" behaviors (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984). In games, the aggregate strategies are attributed to a
specific proportion of Lk types. The model is simple and intuitive, however applications to wider economic settings
first requires some prior on the plausible proportion of types. The popularity of the model has led to a growing
collections of experiment and games that sought to elicit or estimate the proportion of Lk types in a generalized
population.3 The mode in most experiments was found to be the L2 type.
A common concern, with any k-level investigation, is the exogenous specification of the L0 type behavior which
the entire model anchors upon. If such specification is not salient amongst the populations of subjects, then any
estimates proportion of Lk types will most likely be misspecified. To overcome this problem Arad and Rubinstein
(2012) - henceforth known as AR - proposed the "11-20" game, which the authors argue to possess a salient L0
specification. The game involves two players simultaneously choosing an amount of payoﬀ between 20.00 to 11.00
(integers), which they are certain to receive. In addition, a player receives a bonus payoﬀ of 20.00, if his choice
is exactly 1.00 less than the other player. The game has no pure strategy equilibrium, only a mixed-strategy
equilibrium that assigns positive probabilities to the strategies 20.00 to 15.00. In their experiments, AR found that
subjects’ behaviors were significantly diﬀerent from the equilibrium distribution and proposed the k-level process to
explain such deviations. AR make three assumptions in their analysis (1) L0 type player will always choose 20.00,
(2) Higher Lk types will always perfectly best respond to their beliefs and (3) there exist a highest type LK¯ = 9.
As such, a L1 type player best responds with 19.00, a L2 with 18.00, a L3 with 17.00 and so forth.4 AR argue that
the L0 type behavior is salient in their game since it represented the highest payoﬀ a player could receive without
consideration for the behavior of other players. Given their assumptions, the relative proportion of Lk types could
be inferred from the observed strategies in the experiment. Types L1, L2 and L3 are now frequently found in
the proportion 0.12, 0.30 and 0.32 respectively. Subsequent adaptions of the "11-20" game have been utilized by
Lindner and Sutter (2013) to study decision making under time pressure and Alaoui and Penta (2013) to study
iterative reasoning formation.
This paper is motivated by concerns as to whether subjects’ behavior in the "11-20" were well explained by
the k-level process. While the game is simple and intuitive, might it be too simple to be described by the k-level
process? The premise of the k-level process is that subjects who do k steps of iterative thought-experiments do not
expect any other players to do k+1 steps, otherwise they would respond with k+2 steps. The justification is usually
found in the psychological evidence of overconfidence in one’s abilities (see Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; DellaVigna,
2009). Therefore, we should expect each additional step of iterative thought-experiments to be less obvious or more
cognitively demanding. However, the nature of the "11-20" game meant that subjects who do one step of iterative
thought-experiment could easily extend it to two steps or more without incurring significantly cognitive cost.5 If
2In the k-level literature, players are not necessarily restricted to the Lk types. For example Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta
(2001) examine a k-level model that includes the four diﬀerent L0 types, Altruistic, Pessimistic, Naive and Optimistic. The authors
also considered five strategic types starting from our L2 type, the D1 & D2 types that eliminates dominated strategies of one and two
steps, the Sophisticated type that best responds to the actually probabilities distribution of his opponent and the Equilibrium type that
makes equilibrium choices.
3Examples of k-level investigation in the Guessing Game: Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2002); Grosskopf and
Nagel (2008); Burchardi and Penczynski (2010); Chou, McConnell, Nagel, and Plott (2009); Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006); Duﬀy
and Nagel (1997); Kocher and Sutter (2005); Weber (2003); in normal form games Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001); Stahl
and Wilson (1994, 1995), in Rosenthal (1981) centipede game Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012); in auctions Crawford and Iriberri (2007);
in coordination games Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Iriberri (2009); Weber (2001).
4Without the highest LK¯ type, the k-level process in the "11-20" game induces cycles, such that the choice of 20.00 can be attributed
to L0, L10, L20 types and so forth.
5One of the most frequently discussed game in the k-level literature is Nagel (1995) guessing game. Here a group (n ≥ 2) of players
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subjects were indeed adhering to the k-level process as described by AR, shouldn’t even higher types, e.g., L4,
L5, L6 be more frequently observed. Alternatively, could subjects’ behavior also be explained by some statistical
distortion of the mixed-strategy equilibrium such as the Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995, 1996, 1998) or some other coherent distortion owning to the game’s structure. Eventually with experimental
data, there could be multiple competing explanations. The central question in this paper is whether the k-level
process proposed by AR is the dominant explanation and the challenge is to put forth a suitable experiment design
and hypothesis to test this question.6
Denoting the "11-20" game as the baseline game, we take up this challenge with two simple extensions, the
Medium and Extreme game. In the Medium game, players choose from following payoﬀs 20.00, 19.50, 19.00,...,
11.00 which they are certain to receive. The bonus of 20.00 is only awarded if the player’s choice is 0.50 or 1.00 less
than the other player. In the case of the Extreme game, players choose from the payoﬀs 20.00, 19.75, 19.50, 19.25,
19.00,..., 11.00 which they are certain to receive. However, the bonus is now only awarded if the player’s choice is
0.25, 0.50, 0.75 or 1.00 less than the other player. All games - Baseline, Medium and Extreme - share the same
structure and decisional problem. In addition, the games have equivalent mixed-strategy equilibrium distributions
(see Table 1). For example, the strategy of {20.00} in the Baseline game, {20.00, 19.50} in the Medium game and
{20.00, 19.75, 19.50, 19.25} in the Extreme game are all predicted to be chosen with 5% probability. By the k-level
reasoning process, the L0 type in all games will always select the strategy 20.7 However, the behavioral prediction
for higher types are remarkably diﬀerent. The L1 type now best respond with 19.00, 19.50 and 19.75 in the Baseline,
Medium and Extreme games respectively. The corresponding best respond for the L2 types are 18.00, 19.00 and
19.50, for the L3 type 17.00, 18.50 and 19.25, and so forth.
We hence refer to a logical consequence of the k-level process, such that if players were randomly recruited from
the same population into the various games, the k-level process should predict the same proportion of types in all
games. This leads to a simple hypothesis test. The additional benefit of such design controls for any behavior that
might be attributed to the structure of the game and focuses the discussions on the k-level process predictions.
Our experiment procedure involves four classroom experimental sessions over two cohort of students. Students
in the first cohort were recruited into the Baseline and Medium games, whilst those in the second cohort were
recruited in the Medium and Extreme games. The predicted proportion of Lk types as inferred by AR’s k-level
process were compared between sessions of the same cohort and were found to be significantly diﬀerent in all
comparisons.8 Hence, the k-level reasoning process is unable to demonstrate consistency at any reasonable level.
Though this finding does not preclude the possibility that subjects in the Baseline, Medium or Extreme games
were employing some other form of iterative thought-experiments, it suggest that the k-level process was not the
dominant explanation.
This conclusion is also shared by Goeree, Louis, and Zhang (2013) who also replicated the "11-20" game and
provided two other extensions games which shared the same predicted behaviors for each Lk type but have diﬀerent
mixed-strategy equilibriums. They found that the k-level process explains the data no better than the mixed-
choose a number from 0 to 100. A fixed prized is awarded to that player whose number is closest to 2/3 of the average. If a L0 type
player is assume to uniformly randomize across all numbers, a L1 best responds to the uniform randomization. A L2 best respond to
the best respond of a uniform randomization. Owning to the game design, the best respond task becomes more challenging as the step
of iterative thought-experiments increases.
6In their paper, AR consider two other extension of the "11-20" game, the costless iteration and cycle versions. Both extensions
sought to investigate the saliency of the L0 type behavior assuming that the data was generated by the k-level process.
7Despite the games’ diﬀerences, there should be no reason why a L0 type player will behave any diﬀerently in either games. Choosing
20.00 in either games still accords L0 type player the highest payoﬀ without regard for the behavior of the other player.
8Comparisons between sessions of the same cohort controls for the demographic diﬀerences between sessions.
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strategy equilibrium when the predicted proportion of Lk types in their replication "11-20" experiment was fitted
onto the data of the other two extensions. The authors argue that the out-of-sample fit could be enhanced if one
assumes the "common knowledge noise" as in the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) or the Noisy Introspection
(NI) Model (Goeree and Holt, 2004). Allowing for such noise makes the QRE and NI more flexible than the k-level
process but induces the discussion as to whether the performance of the NI and QRE represent a better description
of subjects’ behavior or mere statistical observations.
We hence revisit the k-level process allowing for such noise - henceforth known as the SK model to distinguish
from the k-level process. In addition, we also considered the closely related Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model by
Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004), a close "cousin" of the SK model, that diﬀers on the beliefs of higher type players.
The SK, CH and QRE were fitted onto the respective sessions data via econometric methods. Employing Vuong
(1989) likelihood ratio test, we show that the CH and SK models were able to fit the data significantly better than
the QRE (and mixed-strategy equilibrium). However, the CH and SK models fitted the data as well as each other.
Returning to the central hypothesis test, the estimated proportion of Lk types in the CH model was found to be
consistent between sessions of the same cohort. The SK model estimated proportion of types were found to be
consistent for sessions in the second cohort and to a much lesser extend, the first cohort.
This paper is organized as followed: Section 2 details our experimental procedure, Section 3 provides an overview
of the data and investigate AR’s k-level process, Section 4 introduces the SK and CH models, Sections 5 reports
the estimated results of the SK and CH models and finally, Section 6 concludes.
Cohort 2012 2013
Strategies Eq, B(2012) M(2012) M(2013) E(2013)
2000-1925 .050 .034 .120 .110 .132
1900-1825 .100 .231 .359 .374 .374
1800-1725 .150 .265 .188 .154 .088
1700-1625 .200 .231 .077 .088 .066
1600-1525 .250 .085 .077 .066 .055
1500-1425 .250 .026 .085 .044 .121
1400-1325 .000 .077 .034 .066 .088
1300-1225 .000 .026 .017 .033 .033
1200-1125 .000 .009 .009 .011 .011
1100 .000 .017 .034 .055 .033
N 117 117 91 91
Table 1: Summary of Observed Choice Frequencies and Mixed Strategy Distributions
2 Experiment Procedure
Four classroom experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Exeter, over two cohorts of Intermediate
Microeconomics students. The subjects were mostly economics majors and with no formal training in game theory.
We denote each session by the game which the subjects were enrolled into, followed by the cohort which they were
recruited from. For example, session B(2012) refers to the Baseline game conducted with subjects from cohort
2012. All sessions were conducted during the first lecture class of the course (approximately 250-300 students in
each class), subjects were informed that their participation was voluntary and to refrain from conversing with each
other.
In each cohort, the layout of the lecture class had consisted of three separated seated columns. With cohort
4
2012 and 2013, subjects in the center seated column received the instructions for sessions B(2012) and M(2013)
respectively. With cohort 2012 and 2013, subjects in the two other side columns received instructions for sessions
M(2012) and E(2013) respectively. For the respective games, the instructions were as followed:
Baseline (B) Game: You and another player will simultaneously request an amount of payoﬀ from the
set {2000, 1900, 1800, 1700, ..., 1100} denoted in ECU. Each player will receive his chosen amount.
In addition, a player will receive a bonus of 2000 if his request amount is 100 ECU less than the other
player.
Medium (M) Game: You and another player will simultaneously request an amount of payoﬀ from
the set {2000, 1950, 1900, 1850, ..., 1100} denoted in ECU. Each player will receive his chosen amount.
In addition, a player will receive a bonus of 2000 if his request amount is (a) 50 ECU or (b) 100 ECU
less than the other player.
Extreme (E) Game: You and another player will simultaneously request an amount of payoﬀ from
the set {2000, 1975, 1950, 1925, 1900, ..., 1100} denoted in ECU. Each player will receive his chosen
amount. In addition, a player will receive a bonus of 2000 if his request amount is (a) 25 ECU, (b) 50
ECU, (c) 75 ECU or (d) 100 ECU less than the other player.
Subjects had to circle their choice on a table consisting of all the relevant request amounts. In addition, subjects
were to include their contact details and a brief feedback of their behavior. The sessions were completed within
15 minutes and the instruction sheets were thereafter collect by the experimenters. In each cohort, ten pairs of
subjects were randomly selected for cash payment (they were privately contacted via email) at the exchange rate of
100 ECU to £1. A total of 130, 140, 114 and 94 subjects participated in sessions B(2012), M(2012), M(2013) and
E(2013), respectively.
We choose to split the sessions by the seated columns for ease of instructions distribution and to avoid any
confusion created by subjects seeing the other instructions. Furthermore, this procedure is consistent to that of AR
experiments which were also conducted in classroom settings. However, the same experimental procedure induces
concerns that there might be some natural diﬀerence in behavior due to the seated positions of subjects.9
To address such concerns, the respective sessions were immediately followed up by the Guessing Game (Nagel,
1995).10 Here each player chooses a number between 0 to 100 and a fixed prized is awarded to the player whose
chosen number is closest to a target number, that is derived to be 2/3 multiplied by the average of all chosen
numbers. Subjects in each cohort competed against each other for a fixed prize of £50, were informed that the
Guessing Game was a diﬀerent experiment from the previous sessions and that their participations was voluntary.
The Guessing Game instructions sheets were distributed and collected within 20 minutes. A total of 274 and 206
subjects participated in the Guessing Game for cohorts 2012 and 2013 respectively.
To control for our concerns in the sessions’ data, we had firstly excluded all observations where subjects had
not participated in the Guessing Game. Thereafter, in each cohort, we employed the k-mean clustering algorithm
to identify equal session sample sizes, such that the cumulative distribution of Guessing Game numbers in each
session sample was not significantly diﬀerent from each other.11 This resulted in 117 and 91 observations in each
session of cohort 2012 and 2013 respectively.
9A common observation in our lecture class was that the attentive students had tended to occupy the frontal rows of the center
columns.
10We employed the Guessing Game since it was one the most frequently studied games in the literature of k-level model.
11We verified these results with the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test which reports a pvalue of 0.242 (0.453) in cohort 2012 (2013).
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3 Investigation AR’s k-level Process
The summary of the sessions’ results are reported in Table 1. The first column refers to the strategies, the second
column the mixed-strategy equilibrium and the third column onwards, the aggregated strategies chosen in the
respective sessions. As an empirical warm-up, we first investigate if subjects’ behaviors in the respective sessions were
consistent with the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Here, Fisher’s exact test finds all sessions’ data to be significantly
diﬀerent (two-sided Fisher ρ < 0.001 for all comparisons).12
Result 1: Subjects’ behaviors in sessions B(2012), M(2012), M(2013) and E(2013) were found to be
significantly diﬀerent from the mixed strategy equilibrium.
A prominent diﬀerence pertains to the strategies 1600-1425. These were predicted to be chosen by 50% of the
subjects in each session, but were observed to be chosen by no more than 18% of subjects in any session. Comparing
between sessions of the same game, the B(2012) session data was not found to be significantly diﬀerent from AR’s
results (two-sided Fisher ρ = 0.323), confirming their results. This finding was also shared by replications of the
baseline session by Lindner and Sutter (2013) and Goeree, Louis, and Zhang (2013).
Result 2: Subjects’ behaviors in our B(2012) session was not found to be significantly diﬀerent to those
of Arad and Rubinstein (2012) experiment.
Similarly, the M(2012) and M(2013) sessions’ data were not found to be significantly diﬀerent (two-sided Fisher
ρ = 0.483). The findings insofar suggest that there might be some coherent structure in the behavior of subjects
in the respective games. The central question here is whether such behavior is well explained by the AR’s k-level
process.
As mentioned, AR’s k-level process is characterized by three assumptions (1) L0 type player will always choose
2000 in all games, (2) Higher Lk types will always perfectly best respond to their beliefs and (3) there exist a highest
type LK¯ = 9, 16, 36 in the Baseline, Medium and Extreme game respectively. The predicted proportion of Lk types
were hence directly inferred from the relative choices in the sessions’ data. We report on table 2, the predicted
proportion of Lk types (truncated at the L8 type), as inferred from the sessions’ data, given the assumptions of
AR’s k-level process.
We hence test hypothesis that the predicted proportion of Lk types by the k-level model is consistent across
sessions of the same cohort. In sessions cohort 2012, the predicted proportions are significantly diﬀerent (two-sided
Fisher ρ < 0.001). In session B(2012), 73% of subjects were classified as types L1−L3 whilst the same classification
only pertains to 41% of subjects in M(2012).
Similarly, we the predicted proportion of Lk types in cohort 2013 were found to be significantly diﬀerent (two-
sided Fisher ρ < 0.001). Here, whilst 40% of subjects in session M(2013) were classified as types L1 − L3, only 7%
of subjects in session E(2013) fall under the same classification. Furthermore, a quarter of all subjects in session
E(2013) had chosen the amount 1900, which corresponds to the type L4.
Result 3: The k-level process proposed by Arad and Rubinstein (2012) leads to significantly diﬀerent
predicted proportion of Lk types between sessions of the same cohort.
12For the purposes of our analysis, we chooses the Fisher Exact test over the conventional r × c contingency table chi-square test,
since the test statistics in the latter test requires each cell to have an expected value of at least 1 and that 20% of the cells to have an
expected value of at least 5 (Sheskin, 2003).
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This result suggest that the k-level process remains an incomplete description of subjects’ behavior. One may of
course disagree with our hypothesis test. More specifically, why should we expect the proportion of Lk types to be
similar across sessions of the same cohort? In our view, this alternative is merited if the respective sessions involved
games that were intrinsically diﬀerent. However, in the setting of our experiment, this alternative propounds that
small modifications to the game results in its own unique prediction of Lk types. Whilst such outcome cannot
be exclude, we find it unhelpful, especially if the ambitions of such research is its applicability to wider economic
settings.
It is important to emphasis that result 3 merely suggest, that if subjects in the Baseline, Medium and Extreme
games were performing some form of iterative thought-experiments, this form is unlikely to be the k-level process as
proposed by AR. To investigate if subjects’ behavior are actually characterized by some generalized k-level model,
we introduce a common knowledge noise to the best responding behavior of higher types.
Cohort 2012 2013
B(2012) M(2012) M(2013) E(2013)
L0 .034 .068 .088 .066
L1 .231 .051 .022 .022
L2 .265 .162 .209 .022
L3 .231 .197 .165 .022
L4 .085 .128 .099 .253
L5 .026 .060 .055 .088
L6 .077 .051 .044 .011
L7 .026 .026 .044 .022
≥ L8 .026 .256 .275 .495
N 117 117 91 91
Table 2: Inferred proportion of Lk types by the Arad and Rubinstein (2012) k-level Reasoning Process
4 Modeling Stochastic Best Response
In this section, we relax AR’s assumption that all higher types best respond to their beliefs, allowing for a common
knowledge noise λ ≥ 0 in their best responding behavior. We shall hence refer to this as the Stochastic k-level
(SK) model. This naturally leads to comparisons with the QRE, the rational expectation "statistical refinement" of
the mixed-strategy equilibrium. In addition, we also consider the CH model. To provision for a common platform
of comparison, we will assume that the individual probability choice functions takes the logistic functional form
(McFadden, 1976). In the remaining sub-sections, we will detail the SK and CH models. Discussions of the QRE
model are omitted since it is well known in the literature.
4.1 The SK and CH model
The SK and CH model belong to a class of bounded rationality models. They consider a hierarchical of Lk types
but diﬀer on the assumed beliefs of each higher types. In application to our Baseline, Medium and Extreme games,
both models consider the N = {1, 2} set players where each player i ∈ N simultaneously chooses the strategy
ai ∈ A. Denote πi(ai, a−i) > 0 as the payoﬀ to player i for choosing strategy ai if the other player chooses a−i.
The models anchor upon a L0 type player who is assumed to always choose the action 2000. For any higher Lk
type player i, let bki (g) ∈ [0, 1] denote the proportion of Lg type players he believes to exist in the game. We assume
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that bki (g) = 0 for all g ≥ k, implying that each Lk type player i ignores the possibility that other players might do
the same or more steps of iterative thought-experiments than himself.13 The SK model assumes that each higher
Lk type player believes everyone else to be exactly one type below, resulting in beliefs
bki (g) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
0
if g = k − 1,
if g ̸= k − 1,
∀k > 0,
The CH model on the other hand assumes that each higher Lk type player believes everyone else to be a mixture
of lower types, distributed according to a normalized Poisson distribution. More specifically, for any population
of players, let f(k) ∈ [0, 1] denote the true proportion of Lk type players. The CH model thereafter assumes that
f(0), f(1), ..., f(k),... follows a Poisson distribution with the mean and variance τ , where f(k|τ) = τkexp(−τ)/k!.
Since the CH model also assumes that each higher type players know the true relative proportion of lower types,
they hence hold beliefs
bki (g) =
f(g|τ)∑k−1
h=0 f(h|τ)
∀k > 0, g < k,
If the true proportion of types are clustered around the lower types, then an interesting consequence of the CH
model relative to the SK model, is that the beliefs of higher types players in the former model become more precise
as k increases, whereas the beliefs in latter becomes less precise.
Let pk(ai) ≥ 0 denote the probability of a higher type player i choosing strategy ai ∈ A. The choice probability
function of the higher types in either SK and CH model is assumed to be
pk(ai) =
exp(λπi(ai, ·))∑
a
′
i
∈A exp(λπi(a
′
i, ·))
∀k > 0
where πi(ai, ·) =
∑
a−i∈A
πi(ai, a−i){
∑k−1
g=0 b
k
i (g) · p
g(a−i)} denotes the expected payoﬀ for a higher Lk type player
i with choosing strategy ai.14’15 With the CH model, Rogers, Palfrey, and Camerer (2009) describe such choice
probability function as the the behavior equivalent to a limiting version of the truncated Heterogenous QRE model.
The parameter λ ≥ 0 here denotes the common knowledge error rate in the games. As λ → ∞, each higher Lk
places more weights to the action that accords to him the greatest payoﬀ. Likewise as λ→ 0, each higher type Lk
uniformly randomizes across all strategies.
With data, the SK and CH model are fitted through econometric methods. The econometric results make two
predictions, the common knowledge noise λ and the proportion of Lk types. We are primarily interest in the latter
predictions. The estimation of the SK model first requires some prior arbitrary specification of LK¯ = 2, 3, 4, ... the
highest Lk type one believes to exist in the data. Thereafter, the proportion of types, L0 through to LK¯ and the
13Solving a model where bk
i
(g) ̸= 0 for g ≥ k might also be more complex and involve finding a fixed point at each step of iterative
thought-experiment (Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004).
14One could also model the choice probability function with a normalized power function form
pk(ai) =
(πi(ai, ·))λ
∑
a
′
i
∈A
(πi(a
′
i
, ·))λ
∀k > 0
as in Östling, Wang, Chou, and Camerer (2011), and the results will most probability be identical. We decided upon the Logistic
functional form for natural comparison against the QRE model.
15An alternative specification is to assume that the higher Lk types will uniformly randomize with probability εk ∈ [0, 1] or choose
the action which accords the highest expected payoﬀ with probability (1 − ε) as in Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001). This
alternative may not be immediately applicable to the CH model. Since our objective is to restrict any behavior diﬀerence in the Sk-level
and CH model to assumptions on Lk type beliefs, we choose not to adapt the alternative specification.
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noise λ are estimated from the data (this results in K¯ + 1 free parameters). Since the SK model does not impose
any parametric requirements on the proportion of Lk types, it presents one with certain amount of flexibility in
increasing the statistic fit by considering diﬀerent LK¯ . Estimation of the CH model usually involve setting an
arbitrary high LK¯ . Thereafter, the parameters τ and λ are estimated from the data given the conditions that
f(K¯|τ) > 1− ε. One should note that given the parametric assumptions on the proportion of types, the CH model
is slightly more restrictive than the SK model. However, is such restriction tantamount to a significantly worst
fit?16
5 Estimating Models of Stochastic Best Respond
The estimates from the SK and CH models and the QRE were derived through maximum likelihood estimation (see
Appendix for discussion of MLE procedure). Deriving for the QRE was straightforward and involved econometrically
fitting the data for the noise parameter λ. The SK model was less straightforward since it involved some prior
specification for LK¯ . To avoid overfitting the SK model (K¯ + 1 free parameters), we first generated the estimates
in session B(2012) for LK¯ = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. The likelihood ratio test prefers the estimates where LK¯ = 6 (1% level
significance). We hence estimated the other three sessions with the same highest, LK¯ = 6. The CH model was
estimated with an arbitrary high type LK¯ = 20.
We report on Tables 3 and 4 the estimation results for sessions in cohort 2012 and 2013 respectively. Each table
comprises of three panels. The top panel depicts the observed choices and the predicted choices by the SK, CH
and QRE estimates. The middle panel reports the test statistics of Vuong (1989) likelihood ratio test. The bottom
panel reports the estimated proportion of Lk types by the SK and CH models. We also present on Figure 1, the
predicted frequencies of choices by the QRE (dotted lines), SK (solid lines) and CH (dash lines) estimates.
Before we discuss our results, it is important to emphasis the central diﬀerence between the various models.
The QRE describes a perfectly rational equilibrium where each player best responds to the noisy best respond of
each other player. This corresponds to an eloquent fixed-point argument based on the common knowledge noise λ.
Recent research by Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005) sought to provide some structural forms to plausible quantal
response, however there still remains some ambiguity to the constitution and determinants of λ. Namely, what is
noise and what drives it? Is it specific to population and/or to the game? These are important questions beyond
the scope of this paper. We view such noise as some form of indecisiveness in the game.17 However, we remain
nonchalant about the plausible determines of such noise. Furthermore, we should highlight that such noise in
the QRE is not necessarily equivalent to those in the CH and SK models. The latter two models do not rely on
fixed-point arguments and belong to a class of bounded rationality models. In our interpretation, they could very
well refer to diﬀerent measures of indecisiveness. It will hence not be prudent to make comparisons amongst the λ
estimates.
16In applications to a series of Guessing Game results, Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) adaption of the CH estimated τ ≈ 1.61 (types
L1 and L2 most frequent). They found that the CH model fitted the data as well as the conventional k-level model. Given that the
diﬀerent in the behavior of players between the two models only diﬀer from type L2 onwards, we do not find their results surprising since
most k-level study on the guessing game also found types L1 and L2 to be most frequent. Results in this experiment may potentially
be diﬀerent since the relative "ease" of employing iterative thought-experiments should imply that higher types e.g. L3, L4 and L5, are
more frequently found.
17One could take a more process driven view and see λ as some estimation smoothing parameter.
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B(2012) M(2012)
Strategies Obs. QRE SK CH Obs. QRE SK CH
2000-1950 .034 .128 .055 .113 .120 .220 .146 .173
1900-1850 .231 .197 .230 .190 .359 .268 .341 .303
1800-1750 .265 .220 .264 .268 .188 .187 .179 .209
1700-1650 .231 .188 .230 .216 .077 .111 .086 .088
1600-1550 .085 .120 .085 .082 .077 .072 .065 .061
1500-1450 .026 .062 .025 .041 .085 .051 .054 .050
1400-1350 .077 .034 .075 .031 .034 .037 ,045 .041
1300-1250 .026 .022 .015 .025 .017 .027 .038 .034
1200-1150 .009 .016 .012 .020 .009 .020 .033 .029
1100 .017 .012 .010 .016 .034 .008 .014 .012
λ .0028 .0020 .0021 .0027 .0015 .0017
τ 4.09 3.90
−L 228.42 217.70 225.10 308.61 302.68 304.00
LR test CH QRE CH QRE
SK 2.12a 2.81a SK 0.60 1.67b
CH 1.66b CH 2.27b
a
: ρ < 0.1; b : ρ < 0.05 and c : ρ < 0.01 (one-sided test)
Types L0 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L
†
6
SK Model B(2012) .00 .19 .26 .25 .08 .01 .21
M(2012) .02 .06 .51 .21 .10 .02 .08
CH Model B(2012) .02 .07 .14 .19 .20 .16 .22
M(2012) .02 .08 .15 .20 .20 .15 .20
†
: Refers to types L6 and greater in the CH model
Table 3: Cohort (2012): SK, CH and QRE Estimates
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M(2013) E(2013)
Strategies Obs. QRE SK CH Obs. QRE SK CH
2000-1925 .110 .210 .151 .188 .132 .154 .218 .282
1900-1825 .374 .239 .331 .289 .374 .189 .330 .268
1800-1725 .154 .173 .139 .174 .088 .169 .099 .112
1700-1625 .088 .116 .081 .088 .066 .133 .078 .078
1600-1525 .066 .082 .071 .067 .055 .102 .068 .066
1500-1425 .044 .061 .062 .056 .121 .080 .060 .057
1400-1325 .066 .046 ,055 .048 .088 .065 .052 .049
1300-1225 .033 .035 .048 .040 .033 .053 .046 .043
1200-1125 .011 .027 .042 .034 .011 .044 .040 .037
1100 .055 .011 .019 .015 .033 .010 .009 .008
λ .0024 .0012 .0015 .0015 .0012 .0013
τ 3.64 3.11
−L 247.58 241.38 243.02 314.20 299.97 301.50
LR test CH QRE CH QRE
SK 0.69 1.89b SK 0.81 3.01a
CH 2.68a CH 2.73a
a
: ρ < 0.1; b : ρ < 0.05 and c : ρ < 0.01 (one-sided test)
Types L0 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
SK Model M(2013) .04 .03 .93 .00 .00 .00 .00
E(2013) .04 .06 .90 .00 .00 .00 .00
CH Model M(2013) .03 .10 .17 .21 .19 .14 .16
E(2013) .04 .14 .22 .22 .17 .11 .10
†
: Refers to types L6 and greater in the CH model
Table 4: Cohort (2013): SK, CH and QRE Estimates
5.1 Comparing Statistical Fit
A natural extension to any econometric results is to examine which model provides the best explanatory power
or statistical fit. Readers will usually expect some goodness of fit measures, e.g., R2, pseudo-R2, or information
criterions such as AIC or BIC. We believe there to be interpretative issues with such approaches. For example,
comparisons of R2 favors the model with the highest R2. This approach does not discuss whether the R2 of the
favored model is significantly diﬀerent from the next favored model. Information criterions penalizes additional
parameters in preference for more parsimonious models. Whilst such approach might ideal when comparing nested-
models, interpretation of such criterion is diﬃcult when one considers models which are non-nested or based on
fundamentally diﬀerent assumptions.
In light of these issues, we adopt a statistical comparison which focuses on the diﬀerences in the log-likelihood
values of each model. For our purposes, we employ the Vuong (1989) likelihood ratio test, which allows for pairwise
comparisons between non-nested models.18 Assuming that there exist a true model, the test investigates which
18Vuong (1989) test is not unconventional in the literature of experiments. For example, in their study of the Rosenthal (1981)
centipede game Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012) employ the test to compare the statistical fit of their iterative reasoning models against
the equilibrium driven models. Similarly, Harrison and Rutström (2009) employ the test to compare between decision theory models.
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Figure 1: Actual and Predicted Strategy Frequencies - SK (Solid Lines); CH (Dash Lines); QRE (Dotted Lines)
of two models is "closer" to the true model. The null hypothesis is for both models to be equally close to the
true model and two one-sided alternative hypotheses, that one of the two models is significantly closer to the true
model.19 The test statistics (reported on the middle panel of Tables 3 and 4) is assumed to follow a standard
normal distribution.20’21 For the ease of interpretation, the test statistics are presented in the following manner:
With pairwise comparison, the model with more (less) favorable log-likelihood is position in the row (column) - this
ensures that the test statistics must be positive. This allows us to conduct a simple one-sided test to evaluate if the
row model is significantly "closer" to the true model or fits the data better, relative to the column model.
B(2012): The test prefers the SK and CH models to the QRE (ρ = 0.002 & ρ = 0.048 respectively). However,
the SK is also preferred to the CH model (ρ = 0.017). From top left box of Figure 1, the test results become more
apparent. The SK model tracks the strategies 2000-1400 much better than the other two models. However, this
could also be driven by the fact that such strategies largely correspond to the behavior profiles of L0 − L6 types,
which are by construct free-parameters in the SK model. Although the predicted strategies of the QRE and CH are
observed to correctly peak at 1800, the QRE is noticeably under-predicting (over-predicting) the strategies 1800
and 1700 (1600 and 1500) relative to the CH model.
19The Vuong (1989) test suﬀers from some logical issues if two fundamentally diﬀerent models i.e. Rational expectation and Bounded
Rationality Models, are found to equally close to the true model. Without loss of generality, the null hypothesis can be interpreted as
the condition where we are unable to distinguish between the statistical fit of both models.
20Corrections for degree of freedom are often employ in applications of (Vuong, 1989) likelihood ratio test, to penalize estimates with
more parameters. Whilst such approach might be sensible with nested models, we do not agree that such premises for the purposes of
our study since the models are based on drastically diﬀerent assumptions.
21Clarke (2003) proposes a non-parametric alternative test to the Vuong (1989) test. In our results, the conclusion remain consistent
if one considers either likelihood ratio test.
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M(2012): The test prefers the SK and CH models to the QRE (ρ = 0.048 & ρ = 0.012 respectively). The
test is unable to distinguish between the SK and CH (ρ = 0.274). From top right box of Figure 1, the SK and
CH predicted strategies are observed to correctly peak at 1850 whilst the QRE, at 1800. Furthermore, the QRE
under-predicts the three most frequent strategies (1750, 1800 and 1850) relative to the SK and CH. The SK seems
to track the strategies better than the CH but such diﬀerences were not significant.
M(2013): The test again prefers the SK and CH models to the QRE (ρ = 0.029 & ρ = 0.004 respectively). The
test is unable to distinguish between the SK and CH (ρ = 0.245). From bottom left box of Figure 1, the SK model
is the only model that could account from the sharp drop in strategy frequency at 1950. Again the strategy of 1950
largely corresponds to the behavior profile of the L1 type which is a free parameter in the SK model. However,
whilst the QRE and CH are observed to correctly peak at 1900, the SK is observed to peak at 1850. The QRE
is noticeably under-predicting the three most frequent strategies (1800, 1850 and 1900) relative to the CH. The
performance of the SK relative to the QRE is probably due to its ability to track the lower strategy (1750-1100)
better.
E(2013): The test prefers the SK and CH models to the QRE (ρ = 0.001 & ρ = 0.003 respectively). The test
is unable to distinguish between the SK and CH (ρ = 0.209). From bottom right box of Figure 1, the performance
of the SK and CH over the QRE is fairly obvious. Here, the QRE fit is observed to be a small hump with predicted
frequencies of around 4% at each strategy 2000-1750 and 3-1% and each strategy 1725-1100. The data exhibits
a sharp peak at 1900 (25%) and surprising only CH was able to correct track this peak. However, the predicted
strategy frequency at this peak is still nearly 2 times lower. The SK model is again found to peak one choice away
from the true peak at 1875.
Result 4. The SK and CH estimates were found to have fitted the data significantly better than the
QRE estimates in all four session. The SK estimates had fitted the data significantly better than the CH
estimates in one session and fitted as well in the other three sessions.
In general, the results from the Vuong test suggest that the SK and CH are able to explain the respective session’s
data better than the QRE and the mixed-strategy equilibrium in a similar test.22 The SK model was only found
to explain the data significantly better than the CH model in the B(2012) session. When the same test in session
B(2012) was conducted with the SK model where LK¯ = 5, the SK was again found to fit the data significantly
better than the QRE but as well as the CH model. This suggest that the superior performance of the SK model
over the CH model was primarily driven by the provision of the L6 type. Given these findings, we are confident
that despite the Poisson assumptions, the CH model was still on average able to fit the respective session’s data as
well as the SK model.
5.2 Estimated proportion of Lk types
In this sub-section, we hence focus on the estimated proportion of Lk types by the SK and CH models. Given
our experimental design and procedure, the theoretical predictions for both models is for the similar estimated
proportion of types between sessions of the same cohort.
Cohort 2012 (SK Model): The estimated proportion of types are reported on the bottom panel of Table
3. The L2 types was most frequently estimated in both sessions. However, the proportion of types L0 to L6 in
the B(2012) and M(2012) sessions were found to be significantly diﬀerent (two-sided Fisher ρ < 0.001). Concerned
22The same conclusions were also made for the QRE.
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that such findings were primarily driven by the prior specification of LK¯ , We conducted the same test for LK¯ =
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. However, the proportion of types in both sessions were still found to be significantly diﬀerent (1%
level) for each LK¯ considered.
23 Returning back to estimates on Table 3, the diﬀerences are prominent for type L1
types (0.19 and 0.06), L2 type (0.26 and 0.51) and L6 type (0.21 and 0.08). The estimation procedure of the SK
model is of course sensitive to the distribution of data. Hence we consider a lesser hypothesis test focusing on the
aggregated estimated proportion of L1 − L3 types. Here the corresponding frequency in the B(2012) and M(2012)
were 0.70 and 0.78 respectively, not significantly diﬀerent (two-sided Fisher ρ = 0.295).
Cohort 2012 (CH Model): The estimates of τ was found to be 4.09 and 3.90 in sessions B(2012) and M(2012)
respectively, suggesting that types L3 and L4 should be most frequently found in both sessions. Since the estimated
proportion of types in the CH model are assumed to follow a Poisson distribution, characterized by the mean and
variance τ , the reader should naturally expect some formal test on the equality of τ . There is an extended literature
on such test, building on the pioneering works of Przyborowski and Wilenski (1940). However, such test assumes
that the data generating process follows a Poisson distribution. This is not the case with the CH model, since the
assumptions is for the unobservable proportions of types to follow a Poisson distribution and not the data. We
therefore take an alternative approach, where we derived the estimated proportions of types from L0, L1,..., L5 and
the final proportion that includes type L6 and above (see Table 3). Here, the estimated proportion of types in both
sessions were not found to be significantly diﬀerent (two-sided Fisher ρ = 0.995).
Cohort 2013 (SK Model): The estimated proportions of types are reported on the bottom panel of table 4.
The L2 types was most frequently estimated in both sessions (at least 0.90). Furthermore, the proportion of types
L0 to L6 were not found to be significantly diﬀerent (two-sided Fisher ρ = 0.797).
Cohort 2013 (CH Model): The estimated τ in sessions M(2013) and E(2013) were found to be 3.64 and
3.11 respectively, suggesting that types L3 were most frequently found in both sessions. The estimated proportion
of types are reported on table 4 . Here, the proportion of Lk types were not found to be significantly diﬀerent
(two-sided Fisher ρ = 0.772).
Result 5a. The SK estimated proportions of Lk types were not found to be significantly diﬀerent between
sessions of cohort 2013 and to the lesser extend sessions in cohort 2012.
Result 5b. The CH estimated proportions of Lk types were not found to be significantly diﬀerent
between sessions of cohort 2012 and cohort 2013.
One immediate observation is the obvious diﬀerence in estimated types between the CH and SK model. Consistent
with prior literature on k-level, the SK model found L2 types to be most frequent in all sessions. The average
τ estimated in the CH model was found to be 3.68, which suggest that types L3 and L4 are most frequent.
Furthermore, such τ estimates suggest that types L5 and L6 are still quite substantial. How does one explain such
discrepancy? Are the CH model’s estimates too high? Firstly (and unfortunately), we believe that any estimated
proportion of types is contextualized by the model a researcher employs and the design of the game. One could also
investigate if the low types frequency observed in SK model could due to the stipulated LK¯ . Here one could consider
LK¯ = 8, 9, 10, ..., 100 but such process will obviously be computationally daunting. However, it should be noted that
high τ are not unusual in the literature. For example in their seven week CH model investigation of the Swedish
Lottery LUPI game, Östling, Wang, Chou, and Camerer (2011) estimated τ to be above 4 from week 3 onwards. In
some games (not this game), behavior of subjects converges to the Nash equilibrium as τ →∞ (Camerer, Ho, and
23Even in the most parsimonious case where LK¯ = 3 the estimated proportions of L0, L1, L2 and L3 types were found to be 0.00,
0.19, 0.34 and 0.47 in session B(2012) and 0.02, 0.05. 0.63 and 0.30 in session M(2012).
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Chong, 2004). If one observes adherence to equilibrium behavior in such games, could one inversely argue that such
behavior is not possible because it can only be attributed to a extremely high τ . Another plausible explanations
is that the Lk types as described in the CH and SK model might not be equivalent. In a recent paper, Kawagoe
and Takizawa (2012) estimated a variety of bounded rationality models to investigate behavior in Rosenthal (1981)
centipede game. Amongst the models considered, the authors also estimated a close variation of the SK and CH
models described in this paper. Their SK estimates found types L2 to be most frequent, with types L3 onwards
nearly nonexistent. However, their CH estimated τ was found to be 5.17 which suggested that types L5 were most
frequent.
Another anomaly, pertains to the sharp diﬀerences in SK model’s estimated proportion of types in the M(2012)
and M(2013) sessions. The results suggest that the SK model might be extremely sensitive to the demographic pool
of subjects being investigated. On the other hand, the estimated proportion of types between both Medium game
sessions by the CH model was again found to be consistent (two-sided Fisher ρ = 0.989).
Remark
We were also interested to investigate the influence of the L0 type behavioral specification on the consistency of
the CH model’s estimates. Here that a L0 type player uniformly randomizes across all strategies with probability
z ∈ [0, 1] or chooses 2000 with probability (1 − z) - the above estimates were derived with z = 0. With the CH
model, we estimated the respective sessions for z = 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1. The CH model estimated proportion of Lk
types were found to be consistent between sessions of the same cohort for z = 0, 0.25, 0.50. When z = 0.75, 1, they
were found to be significantly diﬀerent.
6 Discussion
We began this paper by investigating if subjects’ behavior in Arad and Rubinstein (2012) "11-20" game could be
explained by the k-level process proposed by the authors. To do so, we replicated their "11-20" game in our Baseline
design and proposed two other variations: the Medium and Extreme games. All games (Baseline, Medium and
Extreme) have equivalent mixed-strategy equilibriums but are diﬀerentiated by their predicted behaviors for each
Lk types. Whilst subjects’ behavior in our experimental sessions were significantly diﬀerent from the mixed-strategy
equilibrium, the k-level reasoning process predicts significant diﬀerent proportion of Lk types between sessions of
the same cohort of subjects. This is contrary to the theoretical predictions of the k-level reasoning process given our
experimental design and procedure, suggesting that the k-level reasoning process does not well explain the behavior
of subjects in the respective sessions.24
However, when we allow for some flexible in the best responding behaviors of higher types as in the SK and
CH model, we now observed consistent estimated proportion of Lk types in all sessions of the same cohort for
the CH model and to the lesser extend the SK model. Further support for the SK and CH models were found
from the subjects’ experimental feedback. Here 8.5%, 32%, 38% and 30% of the feedbacks from sessions B(2012),
M(2012), M(2013) and E(2013) respectively were either empty or clearly corresponded to random behavior.25 With
the remaining feedbacks, the following two observations were made.
24The alternative view is that subjects’ behavior were well explained by the k-level process. This view must therefore accept that
small changes in any games will result in significantly diﬀerent prediction of Lk type proportions. We find this alternative unhelpful in
extending the k-level reasoning process into wider economic settings.
25The feedbacks were independently evaluated by a graduate student.
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(i) Iterative thought-experiments anchoring on 2000. Most subjects in session B(2012) described their behaviors
as a consequence of an iterative process from 2000 ("I think that a lot of people will choose 1900 because it is
100 lower than the maximum amount. So I have gone for 1800, which is one step lower than that"). Similar
descriptions are also observed in session M(2012) and M(2013) ("I hope that the other person will think that
I have ignore the bonus and thus pick 1950. I therefore picked 1900"). In session E(2013), the descriptions
are less straight forward, but nevertheless involve the discussion of the choice 2000.
(ii) Subjects expect other subjects to best respond stochastically. This is a prominent observation in sessions M(2012),
M(2013) and E(2013) - to some extend in session B(2012). For example a atypical feedback in E(2013) session
is as followed "Many people will expect others to choose 2000 and hence themselves choose 1975, 1950, 1925
or 1900. I therefore choose 1875 to get the bonus".
If subjects’ feedback were truthful, their behavioral are consistent with decision process commonly attributed to
those models of iterative reasoning.26 It is however unclear if such behaviors were more closely associated with the
SK or CH model. How is it therefore possible that two models (SK and CH) of iterative reasoning with substantially
diﬀerent assumptions on the Lk types could explain the data equally well? We conjecture that the true model could
include some mixture of the SK, CH model and quite possibly some "multiple types k-level process". For example,
the Extreme game could be populated by three L1 types. The first who always chooses 1975, the second who
randomizes between 1975 to 1875, and the third who best respond stochastically.
To conclude, like the findings of Goeree, Louis, and Zhang (2013), we disagree with AR’s k-level process for
studying behavior in the "11-20" game. In addition, we find that some modification, such as the introduction of
noise in the players behavior can allow experimenters to explain a wider variety of data. Our findings, suggest that
the "11-20" game has the potential to discriminate among models of iterative thought-experiments and this will be
a target for future research.
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Figure 2: CH Model Log-Likelihood Functions for Sessions B(2012) and M(2012)
Appendix
Estimating the Cognitive Hierarchy Model
The model was estimated using the maximum likelihood techniques. Let p(a) denote the probability of observing
action a ∈ A in the game and yi the i = 1, 2, ..., N observation. Given the model’s construct, one is able to rewrite
p(a|τ,λ) = p0f(0|τ)
K¯∏
k=1
pk(a|λ, τ)f(k|τ)
where pk(a) is the probability of a Lk type choosing a ∈ A, K¯ refers to the highest LK¯ type in the data and
f(k|τ) ∈ [0, 1] is the relative proportion of Lk type given the Poisson assumptions that f(k|τ) = τkexp(−τ)/k!.
The log-likelihood function is therefore
log(L) =
N∑
i=1
log(p(yi|λ, τ))
which was optimized given the constraints
∑K¯
k=0 f(k|τ) > 1 − ε, where ε = 0.001, and the boundary conditions
τ ∈ [0, K¯] and λ ∈ [0, 100].We were uncertain if the log-likelihood function was concave or kinked and thus employed
the direct search, Nelder and Mead (1965) optimization technique. Cautious of such approach, we explored a fine
search termination criteria of 0.0000001 and checked if our estimates (τ and λ) were robust for K¯ = 6, 9, 20. The
estimates were to be robust and the log-likelihood function was observed to be concave (see Figure 2), which suggest
that our estimates were indeed the global maximum.
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Estimating the Sk-level Model
The maximum likelihood technique involves K¯ + 1 free parameters. We hence expressed p(a) as
p(a|α0,α1, ...,αK¯ ,λ) = p
0α0
K¯∏
k=1
pk(a|λ, τ)αk
where αk ∈ [0, 1] denotes the proportion of Lk types in the data, given the constraints that αK¯ = 1−α0−α1− ...−
αK¯−1. We again employed the same estimation techniques as in the CH model. To ensure that our estimates are
the global maximum, we considered multiple random starting values for the parameters α0,α1, ...,αK¯−1. Given this
criteria, we repeated the estimation process 10 times for each session and the estimates were found to be identical
each time. This suggest that our estimates are also the global maximum.
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